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ABSTRACT
Moving Target Defense (MTD) can enhance the resilience of cy-
ber systems against attacks. Although there have been many MTD
techniques, there is no systematic understanding and quantitative
characterization of the power of MTD. In this paper, we propose to
use a cyber epidemic dynamics approach to characterize the power
of MTD. We define and investigate two complementary measures
that are applicable when the defender aims to deploy MTD to achieve
a certain security goal. One measure emphasizes the maximum por-
tion of time during which the system can afford to stay in an un-
desired configuration (or posture), without considering the cost of
deploying MTD. The other measure emphasizes the minimum cost
of deploying MTD, while accommodating that the system has to
stay in an undesired configuration (or posture) for a given portion
of time. Our analytic studies lead to algorithms for optimally de-
ploying MTD.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.4.6 [Security and Protection]
General Terms
Security, Theory
Keywords
Moving target defense, cyber epidemic dynamics, epidemic thresh-
old, security models, cybersecurity dynamics
1. INTRODUCTION
Moving Target Defense (MTD) is believed to be a “game changer"
for cyber defense. Although there have been many studies on spe-
cific MTD techniques, the power of MTD is often demonstrated
via simulation. Rigorously characterizing the power of MTD is an
important problem and is closely related to the well known hard
problem of security metrics. In this paper, we initiate the study of
a novel approach for characterizing the power of MTD.
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1.1 Our Contributions
We propose to use the cyber epidemic dynamics approach to
characterize the power of classes of MTD techniques. We define
and investigate two novel and complementary security measures
that are applicable when using MTD to achieve a certain defense
goal. The first measure is centered on the maximum portion of time
(in the equilibrium) during which the system can afford to stay in an
undesired/insecure configuration (or posture), without considering
the cost of deploying MTD. The second measure is centered on the
minimum cost when the system has to stay in an undesired/insecure
configuration (or posture) for a predetermined portion of time. Our
analytic studies lead to algorithms for deploying MTD in such op-
timal fashions. To our knowledge, this is the first systematic study
on characterizing the power of classes of MTD techniques.
1.2 The Science
Rigorously characterizing the power of MTD (or any defense)
would be a core problem in the science of security. Indeed, the
present study initiates a paradigm for measuring the power of MTD
(or other kinds of defense techniques whose deployment can make
a global difference). The paradigm is centered on measuring the de-
gree of undersired/insecure configurations that can be tolerated by
deploying advanced defense such as MTD. The specific criterion
used in the present paper, namely that the attacks are eventually
wiped out in a certain sense, can be substituted by other criteria.
One possible candidate is the containment of malware infections
to a certain tolerable level [50] (e.g., by appropriately choosing
threshold cryptosystems).
1.3 Related Work
The present paper does not introduce any new MTD technique.
Rather, it studies how to systematically characterize the power of
MTD and optimally launch MTD. Existing studies for a similar
purpose are often based on simulation [1, 2, 27, 21]. There is effort
at analytically evaluating the power of some specific MTD tech-
niques from a localized view [31, 54]; in contrast, we characterize
the power of classes of MTD techniques from a global view.
Cyber epidemic dynamics was rooted in biological epidemic dy-
namics [33, 26]. The first cyber epidemic models [24, 25] were lim-
ited by their homogeneity assumption that each computer/node has
the same effect on the others. Recently, models that are more ap-
propriate for studying cyber security problems have been proposed
[37, 45, 10, 15, 44, 51, 52, 50]. As we will elaborate later, the basic
idea underlying these models is to use a graph-theoretic abstraction
to represent the attack-defense structure, and use parameters to rep-
resent attack and defense capabilities. Cyber epidemic dynamics is
a special kind of cybersecurity dynamics [49],
We will use the cyber epidemic dynamics model in [50] as the
starting point of our study. This model [50] describes reactive
adaptive defense (i.e., the defender aims to adjust its defense to
control/contain the global security state). We extend this model to
accommodate MTD, a kind of proactive defense, and the resulting
model is analyzed using different skills [29, 32]. We mention that
the effect of dynamic structures in cyber epidemic models is stud-
ied in [38], where the structure dynamics however follows a de-
terministic and periodic process, rather than adaptively scheduled
by using (for example) MTD. We also mention that the effect of
dynamic semi-heterogeneous structures (i.e., clustered networks),
rather than arbitrary heterogeneous structures, is studied in [39].
These studies [38, 39] consider static parameters only and do not
have any of the measures we propose to use.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
present a classification of MTD techniques and describe a cyber
epidemic dynamics model that can accommodate MTD. In Section
3, we characterize the power of MTD that induces dynamic param-
eters. In Section 4, we characterize the power of MTD that induces
dynamic attack-defense structures. We discuss the limitations of
the present study in Section 5. We conclude the paper in Section 6.
2. CYBER EPIDEMIC DYNAMICS MODEL
ACCOMMODATING MOVING TARGET
DEFENSE
2.1 Three Classes of Moving Target Defense
Techniques
As mentioned in Section 1.3 and elaborated later, cyber epidemic
dynamics models use a graph-theoretic abstraction to represent the
attack-defense structure, and use parameters to represent attack and
defense ecapabilities. This suggests us to classify MTD techniques
based on what they will induce changes to the attack-defense struc-
ture and/or parameters.
Networks-based MTD Techniques (Class I)
Example techniques that fall into this class are IP address (and
TCP port) randomization and dynamic access control. The ba-
sic idea underlying IP address and TCP port randomization is to
frequently shuffle the IP addresses of computers by using various
methods. One method is to use virtual machine techniques, such as
migrating ensembles of virtual machines [23] and others [48, 53].
Another method is to use networking techniques, such as Network
Address Space Randomization (NASR) whereby IP addresses can
be dynamically assigned (in lieu of DHCP) to render the attacker’s
hitlist useless [1], IP hopping [2] and others [27]. A recent variant
also considers constraints and how to minimize the operation cost
[21].
The basic idea underlying dynamic access control is to dynami-
cally regulate which computers or which network address space can
directly have access to the services in which other network address
space. For example, certain servers on a campus network only ac-
commodate service requests from certain classrooms. By dynami-
cally randomizing IP addresses of authorized computers (e.g., using
aforementioned techniques), some compromised computers cannot
launch direct attacks against some target computers.
Hosts-based MTD Techniques (Class II)
Four kinds of techniques fall into this class: instruction-level, code-
level, memory-level, and application-level. One instruction-level
technique is called Instruction Set Randomization (ISR), which aims
to randomize the instructions of each process so that the attacker
cannot inject executable malicious code [22, 5]. ISR uses a program-
specific key to encrypt the instructions of a program and the pro-
cessor uses the same key to decrypt and run the instructions, where
encryption is often based on binary transformation tools, and de-
cryption is often based on dynamic binary instrumentation tools [5,
4], emulators [22, 7], or architectural support [35, 41, 47].
One code-level technique is code randomization [11, 14]. Code
randomization offers fine-grained protection against code reuse at-
tacks by substituting/reordering instructions, inserting NOPs, and
re-allocating registers. Code randomization operations can be con-
ducted at the compiler [16, 20] or virtual machine level [18], or via
static binary rewriting [36, 46] and runtime binary rewriting [8, 28,
30, 34]. Dynamically generated code can be randomized as well
[19].
One memory-level technique is called Address Space Layout Ran-
domization (ASLR), which defeats code-injection attacks by ran-
domizing the memory layout of a program (e.g., stack) either at
the compile time or at the runtime [42]. ASLR can protect an ex-
ecutable (including the associated static data, stack, heap and dy-
namic libraries) [6] and the operating system kernel [16], but can-
not defeat code reuse attacks.
One application-level technique is called N -version program-
ming [3], by which the defender can dynamically use different im-
plementations of the same program function. Another technique
is called proactive cryptography. Cryptographic properties proven
in abstract models are undermined by attacks (e.g., malware) that
can compromise cryptographic keys. Threshold cryptography can
avoid this single-point-of-failure because it “split" a key into m
pieces such that compromising fewer than t pieces will not cause
exposure of the key, while the cryptographic function can be com-
puted when any t of the m pieces participate [40, 12]. Proactive
cryptography can render the compromised pieces of a key useless
once the pieces are re-shuffled [17].
Instruments-based MTD Techniques (Class III)
The defender can utilize honeypot-like techniques to capture new
attacks. However, the attacker can “tomograph" honeypots and by-
pass the IP addresses monitored by them. Therefore, the defender
can dynamically change the IP addresses monitored by honeypots
[9].
2.2 Cyber Epidemic Dynamics Model Accom-
modating MTD
Cyber Epidemic Dynamics Models
The basic idea underlying cyber epidemic dynamics models (see,
for example, [45, 10, 15, 44, 52, 51, 50]) can be explained as fol-
lows. Cyber attacks are often launched from compromised comput-
ers against vulnerable computers. This means that there exists an
(attacker, victim) relation, which captures that an attacker (e.g.,
compromised computer) can directly attack a victim (e.g., vulnera-
ble) computer. In the extreme case where any computer can attack
any other computer, this relation induces a complete graph struc-
ture. In general, any graph structure can be relevant. The resulting
graph structures are called attack-defense structures, where com-
promised computers/nodes may be detected and cured, but may
later get attacked again. Such models can naturally abstract attack
and defense capabilities as parameters that are associated to the
nodes and edges of attack-defense structures. A core concept in cy-
ber epidemic dynamics models is the so-called epidemic threshold,
namely a sufficient condition under which the epidemic dynamics
converges to the clean state.
Accommodating MTD
We adapt the cyber epidemic dynamics model introduced in [50],
which considers reactive adaptive defense, to accommodate MTD
(i.e., proactive defense). Specifically, the afore-discussed Class
I MTD techniques can be accommodated with dynamic attack-
defense structures, because they can cause that an infected com-
puter may be able to attack a vulnerable computer at time t1 but
not at time t2 > t1 (e.g., the vulnerable computer’s IP address
has been changed). Class II MTD techniques can be accommo-
dated with dynamic parameters because they can affect capabili-
ties of attacker and defender over time. Class III MTD techniques
can be accommodated with dynamic attack-defense structures (be-
cause an IP address assigned to honeypot at time t1 may be re-
assigned to a production computer at time t2 > t1) and dynamic
parameters (because the defender could learn zero-day attacks from
honeypot-captured data, and identify and disseminate countermea-
sures to prevent/detect such attacks). As such, our characterization
study can accommodate the three classes of MTD techniques.
Specifically, we consider a cyber epidemic dynamics model with
dynamic attack-defense structure G(t) = (V,E(t)), where V is
the set of nodes (e.g., computers) and E(t) is the set of edges at
time t such that (w, v) ∈ E(t) means that node w can attack node
v at time t. Suppose |V | = n. We may think V = {1, . . . , n} as
well. Let A(t) = [Avu(t)] denote the adjacency matrix of G(t),
where Avu(t) = 1 if (u, v) ∈ E(t) and Avu(t) = 0 otherwise.
Naturally, we have Auu(t) = 0 for all u ∈ V (i.e., a computer
does not attack itself). Suppose any node v ∈ V has two possible
states: secure or infected. A node v ∈ V is secure if it is vulnerable
but not successfully attacked yet, and infected if it is successfully
attacked. Let iv(t) and sv(t) respectively be the probabilities that
v ∈ V is infected and secure at time t, where iv(t) + sv(t) = 1.
Let γ(t) be the probability that at time t, an infected node u ∈ V
successfully attacks a secure node v ∈ V over (u, v) ∈ E(t).
Let β(t) be the probability that an infected node v ∈ V becomes
secure at time t. Suppose the attacks are independently launched.
The probability that a secure node v ∈ V becomes infected at time
t is [50]:
ξv(t) = 1−
∏
G(t)=(V,E(t)):Avu(t)=1
(1− iu(t)γ(t)) .
The master dynamics equation is [50]:
div(t)
dt
= ξv(t)(1− iv(t))− β(t)iv(t) =(
1−
∏
u∈V
(1−Avu(t)iu(t)γ(t))
)
(1− iv(t))− iv(t)β(t).
This is the starting point of our study. Table 1 lists the main nota-
tions used in the paper.
2.3 Measuring the Power of MTD
Let I∗ = (0, . . . , 0) denote the clean state or equilibrium i∗v
def
=
limt→∞ iv(t) = 0 for all v ∈ V , namely that there are no in-
fected computers in the equilibrium (i.e., the spreading dies out).
Cyber epidemic threshold is a sufficient condition under which the
dynamics converges to I∗ = (0, . . . , 0). In the special case that
G = (V,E) and (β, γ) are independent of t, it is known [10, 15,
44, 51] that the dynamics converges to I∗ = (0, . . . , 0) if
µ
def
= β − γλ1(A) > 0, (1)
where λ1(A) is the largest (in modulus) eigenvalue of the adjacent
matrix A of G. If µ < 0, the dynamics does not converge to I∗ =
(0, . . . , 0) at least for some initial values.
Table 1: Main notations used throughout the paper
X(t), X X(t) is a function of time t, while X is not
G(t) G(t) = (V,E(t)) is attack-defense structure at
time t: a graph of node set V and edge set E(t),
where |V | = n
A(t) adjacency matrix of G(t) = (V,E(t))
sv(t), iv(t) the probability node v is secure or infected at time
t
i∗v the probability node v is infected as t → ∞ (if
existing)
I∗ I∗
def
= (i∗1, . . . , i
∗
n) where n = |V |
β(t) the cure probability that an infected node becomes
secure at time t (reflecting defense power)
γ(t) the infection probability that infected node u suc-
cessfully attacks secure node v over edge (u, v) ∈
E(t)
C(t) C(t) = (G(t), β(t), γ(t)) is system configuration
or posture at time t
C1 C1 = (G1, β1, γ1) is the undesired/insecure con-
figuration that violates the convergence condition
Cj Cj = (Gj , βj , γj) for j ≥ 2 are MTD-induced
desired configurations that satisfy the convergence
condition
λ1(A) the largest eigenvalue (in modulus) of matrix A
In the n-dimensional identity matrix
‖ · ‖ the 2-norm of vector or matrix
s←R S select s as a random element of set S
T ← exp(a) assign T a value according to the exponential dis-
tribution with parameter a
Suppose the defender is confronted with configuration or posture
C1 = (G1 = (V,E1), β1, γ1), under which condition (1) does
not hold. Suppose the defender can launch combinations of MTD
techniques to induce configurations Cj = (Gj = (V,Ej), βj , γj)
for j ≥ 2, each of which satisfies condition (1). If the defender
can always assure (G(t), β(t), γ(t)) = Cj = (Gj , βj , γj) for any
t > 0 and some j ≥ 2, the problem is solved because the defender
can make the dynamics converge to I∗ = (0, . . . , 0) by launching
MTD to induce Cj . However, it would be more realistic that the
defender can maintain such configurations as Cj (j ≥ 2) for a small
period of time, because the attacker can introduce (for example)
zero-day attacks to force the system to depart from configuration Cj
and enter configuration C1. Moreover, the system may have to stay
in configuration C1 at least for some period of time because G1 =
(V,E1) is necessary for facilitating some applications. Figure 1
illustrates the idea of using MTD to make the overall dynamics
converge to I∗ = (0, . . . , 0), while allowing the system to stay
for some portion of time in the undersired configuration C1, which
violates condition (1).
The preceding discussion leads us to define two measures of
power of MTD. The first definition captures the maximum time
the system can afford to stay in the undersired configuration C1
while the overall dynamics converges to I∗ = (0, . . . , 0) because
of MTD, without considering cost.
DEFINITION 1. (power of MTD without considering cost) Con-
sider undesired configuration C1 = (G1, β1, γ1) that violates con-
dition (1). Suppose the defender can launch MTD to induce con-
figurations Cj = (Gj , βj , γj) for j ∈ [2, . . . , J ], where each
Cj satisfies condition (1). Denote by µk = βk − γkλ1(Ak) for
k = 1, . . . , J , where Ak is the adjacency matrix of Gk . We say
MTD is (µ1, µ2, . . . , µJ , π∗1)-powerful if it can make the overall
Time t
Non-MTD C1 MTD C2 Non-MTD C1 MTD C3
0 t1 t2 t3 t4
Figure 1: Illustration of MTD-induced switching of configu-
rations: The system is in configuration C1 during time inter-
val [0, t1), in C2 during time interval [t1, t2) because the de-
fender launches MTD, etc. Although C1 violates condition (1),
the overall dynamics can converge to I∗ = (0, . . . , 0) because
of MTD. Note that C2 and C3 may reside in between two C1’s
(i.e., launching two combinations of MTD to induce C2 and C3
before returning to C1).
dynamics converge to I∗ = (0, . . . , 0), while allowing the system
to stay in configuration C1 for the maximum π∗1 -portion of time in
the equilibrium.
The second definition captures the minimum cost with respect to
a given portion of time, π1, during which the system must stay in
configuration C1.
DEFINITION 2. (power of MTD while considering cost) Con-
sider undesired configuration C1 = (G1, β1, γ1) that violates con-
dition (1), and the potion of time π1 that the system must stay in
configuration C1. Suppose the defender can launch MTD to in-
duce configurations Cj = (Gj , βj , γj) for j = 2, . . . , J , where
each Cj satisfies condition (1). Denote by µj = βj − γjλ1(Aj)
for j = 2, . . . , J , where Aj is the adjacency matrix of Gj . Con-
sider cost function h(·) : R+ → R+ such that h(µj) is the cost
of launching MTD to induce configuration Cj for j = 2, . . . , J ,
where h′(µ) ≥ 0 for µ > 0. For give cost function h(·), we say
MTD is (µ1, µ2, · · · , µJ , π1,Υ)-powerful if the overall dynamics
converges to I∗ = (0, . . . , 0) at the minimum cost Υ(π∗2 , · · · , π∗J),
where π∗j (2 ≤ j ≤ J) is the portion of time the system stays in
configuration Cj in the equilibrium.
Remark. Definitions 1-2 characterize the power of MTD from
two complementary perspectives. Definition 1 does not explicitly
mention π∗2 , . . . , π∗J because the problem of computing π∗2 , . . . , π∗N
is orthogonal to the existence of π∗1 . Nevertheless, all of our results
allow to explicitly compute π∗2 , · · · , π∗N . Definition 2 explicitly
mentions π∗2 , . . . , π∗J because they are essential to the definition of
minimum cost, where π1 is not a parameter of the cost Υ because
the system must stay in C1 for a predetermined portion of time π1.
3. POWER OF MTD INDUCING DYNAMIC
PARAMETERS
In this section we characterize the power of MTD that induces
dynamic parameters but keeps the attack-defense structure intact
(i.e., G is independent of time t throughout this section). Let A be
the adjacency matrix of G. We first recall the following theorem
from [50] and present a corollary of it.
THEOREM 1. ([50]) Consider configurations (G, β(t), γ(t)),
where the dynamic parameters β(t) and γ(t) are driven by some
ergodic stochastic process. Let E(β(0)) and E(γ(0)) be the re-
spective expectations of the stationary distributions of the process.
Suppose convergences limt→∞
∫ t0+t
t0
β(τ )dτ = E(β(0)) and
limt→∞
∫ t0+t
t0
γ(τ )dτ = E(γ(0)) are uniform with respect to t0
almost surely. If E(β(0))/E(γ(0)) > λ1(A), the dynamics con-
verges to I∗ = (0, . . . , 0) almost surely; if E(β(0))/E(γ(0)) <
λ1(A), there might exist infected nodes in the equilibrium.
COROLLARY 1. Consider configurations (G, β(t), γ(t)), where
(β(t), γ(t)) are driven by a homogeneous Markov process ηt with
steady-state distribution [π1, · · · , πN ] and support
{(β1, γ1), . . . , (βN , γN)}, meaning E(βηt) = π1β1+· · ·+πNβN
and E(γηt) = π1γ1 + · · ·+ πNγN . If
π1β1 + · · ·+ πNβN
π1γ1 + · · ·+ πNγN > λ1(A), (2)
the dynamics will converge to I∗ = (0, . . . , 0); if
π1β1 + · · ·+ πNβN
π1γ1 + · · ·+ πNγN < λ1(A),
the dynamics will not converge to I∗ = (0, . . . , 0) at least for some
initial value scenarios.
3.1 Characterizing Power of MTD without Con-
sidering Cost
In this case, despite that C1 = (G, β1, γ1) violates condition
(1), the system needs to stay as much as possible in configura-
tion C1. Fortunately, the defender can exploit MTD to make the
overall dynamics converge to I∗ = (0, . . . , 0). This is possi-
ble because MTD can induce configurations Cj = (G, βj , γj) for
j = 2, . . . , N , where each Cj satisfies condition (1). Denote by
µj = βj − γjλ1(A) for j = 1, · · · , N . Without loss of generality,
suppose µ1 < 0 < µ2 < · · · < µN . According to Corollary 1, if
π1µ1 + · · ·+ πNµN > 0, (3)
then the dynamics will converge to I∗ = (0, . . . , 0). Since in-
equality (3) is strict and is a linear function of π1, in order to reach
the maximum π∗1 we need to introduce a sufficiently small constant
0 < δ ≪ 1 and replace condition (3) with
π1µ1 + · · ·+ πNµN ≥ δ. (4)
Theorem 2 constructively identifies the maximum π∗1 , the maximal
portion of time the system can afford to stay in C1.
THEOREM 2. Suppose configuration C1 = (G, β1, γ1) violates
condition (1). Suppose MTD-induced configurations Cj = (G, βj , γj)
for j = 2, · · · , N satisfy condition (1) as 0 < µ2 < · · · < µN .
The maximal potion of time the system can afford to stay in config-
uration C1 is
π∗1 =
µN − δ
µN − µ1 , (5)
while the system will stay in configurations C2, . . . , CN respectively
with portions of time given by
π∗2 = · · · = π∗N−1 = 0, π∗N = δ − µ1µN − µ1 .
In other words, MTD is (µ1, · · · , µN , π∗1)-powerful.
PROOF. Eq. (4) implies
π1 ≤ π2µ2 + · · ·+ πNµN − δ−µ1 ≤
(π2 + · · ·+ πN )µN − δ
−µ1
(6)
=
(1− π1)µN − δ
−µ1 ,
which means
π1 ≤ µN − δ
µN − µ1 . (7)
Moreover, this maximum π∗1 can be reached if all the equalities in
Eqs. (6) and (7) hold, namely
π2 = · · · = πN−1 = 0, πN = δ − µ1
µN − µ1 .
This means that the defender only needs to launch the MTD that
induces configuration CN = (G, βN , γN ).
Theorem 2 says that although the defender can launch MTD to
induce a set of (N − 1) configurations, C2, . . . , CN with 0 < µ2 <
· · · < µN , only CN matters. This means that µk is indicative of the
capability of a configuration. Figure 2 plots the dependence of π∗1
on −µ1 and µN with δ = 10−5. We observe that for fixed µ1, the
maximum portion of time π∗1 monotonically non-decreases in µN .
For example, by fixing µ1 = −0.4, π∗1 is a non-decreasing curve
in µN .
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Figure 2: Dependence of π∗1 on −µ1 and µN .
3.2 Characterizing Power of MTD while Con-
sidering Cost
In this case, configuration C1 = (G, β1, γ1) is given and the time
the system must stay in C1 is predetermined as π1. The defender
wants to deploy MTD to make the overall dynamics converge to
I∗ = (0, . . . , 0), while minimizing the cost of launching MTD.
Denote the MTD-induced configurations by Cj = (G, βj , γj) for
2 ≤ j ≤ N . Note that cost may only be considered for N ≥ 3
because when N = 2, it is more meaningful to maximize π∗1 (i.e.,
the preceding case).
Since we have proved that π1 ≤ π∗1 = µN−δµN−µ1 is necessary to
make the dynamics converge to I∗ = (0, . . . , 0), µN−δ
µN−µ1
is the
natural upper bound on π1 (i.e., if π1 is above the upper bound,
we cannot assure the dynamics will converge to I∗ = (0, . . . , 0),
regardless of the cost). Consider cost function f(·) : R+ → R+
as in Definition 2. such that f(µj) is the cost of launching MTD
to induce configuration Cj for 2 ≤ j ≤ N , where f ′(µ) ≥ 0 for
µ > 0. The objective is to minimize, for given cost function f(·)
and any constant f(µ1), the following cost:
Φ(π2, · · · , πN ) = π1f(µ1) +
N∑
j=2
πjf(µj) (8)
subject to
π1β1 +
∑N
j=2 πjβj
π1γ1 +
∑N
j=2 πjγj
> λ1(A), π1 +
N∑
j=2
πj = 1, πj ≥ 0 (9)
Since π1β1+
∑N
j=2 πjβj
π1γ1+
∑
N
j=2 πjγj
> λ1(A) is equivalent to π1µ1+
∑N
j=2 µj >
0, Eq. (9) is equivalent to:
N∑
j=2
πjµj > −π1µ1,
N∑
j=2
πj = 1− π1, πj ≥ 0. (10)
Since the objective is linear and the optimal solution would get on
bound of the non-closed constraint (10), we need to introduce a
sufficiently small constant 0 < δ ≪ 1 and replace constraint (10)
with
N∑
j=2
πjµj ≥ −π1µ1 + δ,
N∑
j=2
πj = 1− π1, πj ≥ 0. (11)
Theorem 3 shows how to find the minimum cost Φ(π∗2 , · · · , π∗N )
according to constraints (8) and (11), and therefore gives an algo-
rithm for the optimization problem. Proof of Theorem 3 is deferred
to the Appendix.
THEOREM 3. Suppose configuration C1 = (G, β1, γ1) violates
condition (1). Suppose MTD-induced configurations Cj = (G, βj , γj)
for j = 2, · · · , N satisfy condition (1). Suppose π1, where 0 <
π1 ≤ µN−δµN−µ1 , is the potion of time the system must stay in C1.
Suppose f(·) is the cost function as discussed above. Define
µk∗ = min
{
µk|µk > −π1µ1
(1− π1) , 2 ≤ k ≤ N
}
(12)
and for 2 ≤ l < m ≤ N ,
F (µl, µm) =π1f(µ1) +
f(µm)− f(µl)
µm − µl (δ − π1µ1)
+
µmf(µl)− µlf(µm)
µm − µl (1− π1). (13)
If k∗ = 2, the minimal cost under constraint (11) is
min
π2,··· ,πN
Φ(π2, · · · , πN ) = π1f(µ1) + (1− π1)f(µ2),
which is reached by launching MTD to induce configuration C2
only. If k∗ > 2, the minimal cost under constraint (11) is
min
π2,··· ,πN
Φ(π2, · · · , πN ) = min
l<k∗≤m
F (µl, µm). (14)
Denote by {µl∗ , µm∗} = arg min
l<k∗≤m
F (µl, µm). The minimal
cost is reached by launching MTD to induce configurations Cl∗ , Cm∗
respectively with portions of time [πl∗ , πm∗ ]:[
πl∗
πm∗
]
=
1
µm∗ − µl∗
[
(µm∗ − δ) + π1(µ1 − µm∗ )
−(µl∗ − δ) + π1(µl∗ − µ1)
]
,
(15)
where 0 < δ ≪ 1 is some constant. That is, MTD is
(µ1, µ2, · · · , µN , π1,Φ)-powerful.
3.3 Algorithm for Orchestrating Optimal MTD
When not considering cost, Theorem 2 constructively gives a
method for optimally launching MTD. When considering arbitrary
cost function f(·), Theorem 3 constructively shows how to find
the minimum cost Φ(π∗2 , · · · , π∗N) according to constraints (8) and
(11), and therefore gives a method for computing the minimum
cost and the corresponding strategy for optimally launching MTD.
Theorems 2-3 suggest many possible ways/algorithms to achieve
the goal, with Algorithm 1 being a concrete example.
Algorithm 1 Launching optimal MTD (dynamic parameters)
INPUT: initial configuration C1 = (G, β1, γ1), MTD-induced con-
figurations Cj = (G, βj , γj) for j = 2, · · · , N and N ≥ 2, con-
stant a > 0 determining time resolution, optional cost function
f(·), δ (0 < δ << 1), optional π1
OUTPUT: Optimal MTD strategy
1: if cost function is not given (i.e., no need to consider cost) then
2: Compute π∗1 according to Eq. (5)
3: while TRUE do
4: Wait for time T1 ← exp(a/π∗1) {system in C1}
5: Launch MTD to make system stay in CN for time TN ←
exp(a/(1− π∗1))
6: Stop launching MTD {system returns to C1}
7: end while
8: else
9: Compute k∗ according to Eq. (12)
10: if k∗ > 2 then
11: Compute µl∗ , µm∗ according to Eq. (13)
12: Compute πl∗ , πm∗ according to Eq. (15)
13: else
14: Set l∗ = m∗ = 2 and πl∗ = 1− π1
15: end if
16: Wait for time T1 ← exp(a/π1) {system in C1}
17: j ←R {l∗,m∗} {j = 2 when l∗ = m∗ = 2}
18: while TRUE do
19: Launch MTD to make system stay in Cj for time T ←
exp(a/πj) {system in Cj}
20: Set ∆ = {1, l∗,m∗} − {j}
21: j ←R ∆ {j = 1 when l∗ = m∗ = 2}
22: if j = 1 then
23: Stop launching MTD and wait for time T1 ←
exp(a/π1) {system in C1}
24: j ←R {l∗,m∗}
25: end if
26: end while
27: end if
Specifically, lines 2-7 describe the algorithm corresponding to
Theorem 2 (i.e., not considering cost), where line 4 instructs the
defender not to launch MTD so that the system stays in config-
uration C1 for a period of time T1, and line 5 instructs the de-
fender to launch MTD to make the system stay in configuration
CN for the period of time TN . On the other hand, lines 9-26 de-
scribe the algorithm corresponding to Theorem 3 (i.e., considering
cost). If k∗ = 2, the defender needs to make the cyber system
stay alternatively in configurations C1 and C2. If k∗ > 2, the de-
fender needs to make the cyber system stay alternatively in con-
figurations C1 for a period of time T1, in configuration Cl∗ for
a period of time Tl∗ and/or in configuration Cm∗ for a period of
time Tm∗ . Depending on the random coins flipped on lines 21 and
24, possible configuration sequences include: C1, Cl∗ , Cm∗ , C1, . . .
and C1, Cl∗ , Cm∗ , Cl∗ , C1, . . .. Another algorithm for achieving the
same goal it to make the system in C1, Cl∗ , Cm∗ , C1, Cl∗ , Cm∗ , . . .
periodically for periods of time T1, Tl∗ , Tm∗ , respectively.
The computational complexity of Algorithm 1 is straightforward.
When not considering cost, the algorithm incurs O(1) computa-
tional complexity. When considering cost, line 9 incurs O(N)
complexity for searching k∗ according to (12), line 11 incursO(N2)
complexity for searching the optimal l∗ and m∗ according to (13),
and all other steps incur O(1) complexity.
3.4 Simpler Algorithm for Convex and Con-
cave Cost Functions
Algorithm 1 applies to arbitrary cost function f(·). We make
a further observation on Theorem 3, which says that for any given
0 < π∗1 ≤ µN−δµN−µ1 and cost function f(·), if k
∗ = 2, the min-
imum cost is reached by inducing configuration C2; if k∗ > 2,
Eqs. (13) and (14) indicate that the minimum cost is dependent
upon the property of f(·). Now we show that when f(·) is con-
vex or concave, which may hold for most scenarios, we can obtain
closed-form results on l∗, m∗, and therefore Algorithm 1 is natu-
rally simplified. Recall that µ2 < · · · < µN . Define R(µl, µm) =
f(µm)−f(µl)
µm−µl
. It can be verified that
F (µl, µm) =π
∗
1f(µ1) + (1− π∗1)f(µl)
+R(µl, µm)[(δ − π∗1µ1)− µl(1− π∗1)]
=π∗1f(µ1) + (1− π∗1)f(µm)
+R(µl, µm)[(δ − π∗1µ1)− µm(1− π∗1)].
• If f(·) is convex, namely f ′′(·) ≥ 0, then for fixed µl (or
µm), R(µl, µm) is monotonically non-decreasing in µm (or
µl). Note that µl < δ−π
∗
1µ1
1−π∗1
≤ µm, where δ ≪ 1. For fixed
µl (or µm), F (µl, µm) is monotonically non-decreasing (or
non-increasing) in µm (or µl). The minimum cost is
min
l<k∗≤m
F (µl, µm) = F (µk∗−1, µk∗). (16)
Having identified µk∗−1, µk∗ , one can compute πk∗−1, πk∗
according to (15). Thus, lines 11 and 12 are simplified by
this analytical result, with the complexity of searching for
the optimal solution (i.e., k∗ in this case) reduced to O(N).
• If f(·) is concave, namely f ′′(·) ≤ 0, then for fixed µl (or
µm), R(µl, µm) is monotonically non-increasing (or non-
decreasing) in µm (or µm). The minimum cost is
min
l<k∗≤m
F (µl, µm) = F (µ2, µN ). (17)
Similarly, having identified µ2, µN , one can compute π2, πN
according to (15). Thus, lines 11 and 12 are simplified by
this analytical result, with the complexity of searching for
the optimal solution reduced to O(1).
The above discussion suggests the following: If f(·) is convex,
the defender only needs to launch MTD to induce configurations
Ck∗−1, Ck∗ ; if f(·) is concave, the defender only needs to launch
MTD to induce configurations C2, CN .
To illustrate the influence of f(·) on the power of MTD, we set
N = 4, (β1, γ1) = (0.2, 0.00422), (β2, γ2) = (0.4, 0.000845),
(β3, γ3) = (0.6, 0.00169), (β4, γ4) = (0.8, 0.00169), δ = 10
−5
,
λ1(A) = 118.4, µ1 − δ ≈ −0.3, µ2 − δ ≈ 0.3, µ3 − δ ≈ 0.4,
and µ4 − δ ≈ 0.6. From Eq. (5), we get π∗1 ≤ µ4−δµ4−µ1 =
2
3
.
We set π∗1 = 35 , which means k
∗ = 4. Figure 3 plots the to-
tal cost Φ with different cost functions f(·), where π4 = 1 −
π1 − π2 − π3. The shadow area in the π2π3-plane is the con-
strain slope of π2, π3 with respect to condition (11). Note that Φ =
π∗1f(µ1)+π2f(µ2)+π3f(µ3)+(1−π∗1−π2−π3)f(µ4), which
is linear non-increasing in π2 for fixed π3 (also in π3 for fixed π2).
For convex function f(x) = 100(x + 0.1)2, the above analysis
revealed that the minimum cost is reached at [π3, π4] = [πl∗ , πm∗ ]
as given by Eq. (15), namely by launching MTD to induce configu-
rations C3, C4. Figure 3(a) shows that the minimum cost is reached
at [π2, π3, π4] = [0, 0.3, 0.1] and the minimum cost is 14.6, which
matches the analytic result given by Eq. (16). For concave function
f(x) = 10
√
x+ 0.5, Figure 3(b) shows that the minimum cost
is reached at [π1, π2, π3] = [0.2, 0, 0.2] and the minimum cost is
6.5696, which matches the analytic result given by Eq. (17).
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4. POWER OF MTD INDUCING DYNAMIC
STRUCTURES
In this section, we characterize the power of MTD that induces
dynamic attack-defense structuresG(t), while the parameters (β, γ)
are kept intact. More specifically, suppose configuration C1 =
(G1, β, γ) violates condition (1). Suppose MTD-induced config-
urations Cl = (Gl, β, γ) for l = 2, · · · , N ′ and N ′ ≥ 2 satisfy
condition (1). We want to identify a Markov process strategy σt,
defined over C1, C2, . . . , CN′ , to make the dynamics converge to
equilibrium I∗ = (0, . . . , 0), while staying in configuration C1
as much as possible or minimizing the cost of launching MTD.
Throughout this section, let Al be the adjacency matrix of Gl for
l = 2, . . . , N ′.
We start with a general result where one or more configurations
violating condition (1).
THEOREM 4. Consider Cl = (Gl, β, γ) for l = 1, · · · , N ′,
where Cℓ = (Gℓ, β, γ) for some 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ j violate condition (1)
but Ck = (Gk, β, γ) for some j < k ≤ N ′ satisfy condition (1).
Then, the overall dynamics converges to I∗ = (0, . . . , 0) almost
surely under Markov process strategy σt with infinitesimal genera-
tor Q = (quv)N′×N′ defined as:
(i) for k > j, −qkk ≤ 2a[β−γλ1(Ak)−δ]jc+N′−1−j
N′−1
−a
;
(ii) for ℓ ≤ j, −qℓℓ ≥ 2b[γλ1(Aℓ)−β+δ]
b−
c(j−1)
N′−1
−N
′
−j
N′−1
;
(iii) qrp = −qrrN′−1 for all p 6= r and p, r ∈ {1, . . . , N ′}.
PROOF. Suppose (if needed, with reordering)
λ1(A1) ≥ · · ·λ1(Aj) > β
γ
> λ1(Aj+1) · · · ≥ λ1(AN′). (18)
For any k > j, [γAk−βIn] is a Hurwitz matrix [43] (i.e., real parts
of all eigenvalues are negative), meaning that there exist positive
definite matrices Pk < In and a constant 0 < δ ≪ 1 such that
(Pk[γAk − βIn])s = [γλ1(Ak) − β + δ2 ]Pk < 0. We can find
positive definite matrices Pℓ with ℓ ≤ j and positive constants
a < 1 < b < c such that
aIn < Pk < In < bIn < Pℓ < cIn, ∀k > j, ℓ ≤ j,
and
{Pℓ[γAℓ − βIn]}s ≤ [γλ1(Aℓ)− β + δ
2
]Pℓ, ∀ ℓ ≤ j.
By combining (i)-(iii) in the condition of the theorem, we obtain
{Pm[γAm − βIn]}s + 1
2
N′∑
r=1
qrmPr ≤ − δ
2
In. (19)
Since the parameters are static and the structures are driven by
Markov process σt, the dynamics of iv(t) for v ∈ V is:
div(t)
dt
=
[
1−
∏
u∈V
[1− γ(Aσt)vuiu(t)]
]
(1− iv(t))− βiv(t).
(20)
Since[
1−
∏
u∈V
[1− γ(Aσt)vuiu(t)]
]
(1− iv(t)) ≤
∑
u∈V
γ(Aσt)vuiu(t)
always holds, we define a new variable yv(t) with dynamics:
dyv(t)
dt
=
∑
u∈V
γ(Aσt)vuyu(t)− βyv(t). (21)
Note that any sample point w ∈ Ω corresponds to a deterministic
σt(w). Let
i(t) = [i1(t), · · · , in(t)]⊤, y(t) = [y1(t), · · · , yn(t)]⊤
be the solutions of systems (20) and (21) under the Markov switch-
ing process σt(w) respectively. From the comparison theory of
differential equations, we know i(t) ≤ y(t) holds if i(0) = y(0),
which implies that E[‖i(t)‖2] ≤ E[‖y(t)‖2].
Let V (y(t), t, σt) = 12y(t)
⊤P (σt)y(t) and ζ = δ2c . The joint
process {(y(t), σt) : t > 0} is a strong Markov process and the
infinitesimal generator of the process is:
L = Q+ diag{y⊤P⊤(1) ∂
∂y
, · · · , y⊤P⊤(N ′) ∂
∂y
}
Then, we have
LV (y, t, j) =
N∑
k=1
qkjV (y, t, k) + (
∂V (y, t, j)
∂y
)⊤y˙,
From the Dynkin Formula [13] and Eq. (19), we have
EeζtV (y(t), t, σt)
= V (y0, 0, σ0) + E
∫ t
0
ζeζτV (y(τ ), τ, στ )dτ
+E
∫ t
0
eζτLV (y(τ ), τ, στ )dτ
= V (y0, 0, σ0) + E
∫ t
0
ζeζτy(τ )⊤P (στ )y(τ )dτ
+E
∫ t
0
eζτy(τ )⊤{P (στ )[γA(στ )− βIn]}sy(τ )dτ
+
1
2
E
∫ t
0
eζτy(τ )⊤
N′∑
r=1
qr,στP (r)y(τ )dτ
≤ V (y0, 0, σ0).
Hence, we have
E
[
‖i(t)‖2
]
≤ E
[
‖y(t)‖2
]
≤ 2EV (y(t), t, σt)
a
≤ 2V (y0, 0, σ0)
a
e−ζt,
which implies that ‖i(t)‖ converges to zero almost surely for all v.
This completes the proof.
4.1 Characterizing Power of MTD without Con-
sidering Cost
THEOREM 5. Suppose configuration C1 = (G1, β, γ) violates
condition (1) and MTD-induced configurations Cl = (Gl, β, γ)
for l = 2, . . . , N ′ satisfy condition (1). Denote by µl = β −
γλ1(Aj) for l = 1, . . . , N ′. Without loss of generality, suppose
µ1 < 0 < µ2 < · · · < µN′ . Under the definition of Q in Theorem
4, the maximum portion of time the system can afford to stay in
configuration C1 is
π∗1 =
b−1
2b[−µ1+δ]
b−1
2b[−µ1+δ]
+ c−a
2a[µN′−δ]
, (22)
which is reached by launching MTD to induce configuration (GN′ , β, γ).
That is, MTD is (µ1, · · · , µN′ , π∗1)-powerful.
PROOF. The infinitesimal generator Q defined in the proof of
Theorem 4 specifies the desired law σt, which can guide the de-
ployment of MTD to force the overall dynamics converge to I∗ =
(0, . . . , 0). Note that j in Eq. (18) represents the number of config-
urations that violate condition (1). Hence, j = 1 in the present sce-
nario. For each r ∈ {1, . . . , N ′}, let xr = 1−qrr ; then πr =
xr∑
p xp
is the portion of time in configuration Cr. Let a, b, c be as defined
in the proof of Theorem 4.
Consider configurations {C1, Ck1 , · · · , Ckm}, where m ≤ N ′,
and Ckl = (Gkl , β, γ) for l ∈ {1, · · · ,m} and {k1, . . . , km} ⊆
{2, · · · , N ′} (which will be determined below) are MTD-induced
configurations. Under the definition of Q in Theorem 4, we have
x1 ≤ b− 1
2b[−µ1 + δ] , xkl ≥
c+m−1
m
− a
2a[µkl − δ]
, l = 1, · · · ,m.
This means that the dynamics converges to I∗ = (0, . . . , 0), while
staying in configuration C1 for a portion of time π1, where
π1 =
x1
x1 + xk1 + · · ·+ xkm
≤ x1
x1 +
∑
l
c+m−1
m
−a
2a[µkl
−δ]
≤ x1
x1 +
c+m−1−am
2a[maxl µkl
−δ]
≤ x1
x1 +
c−a
2a[µk
N′
−δ]
≤
b−1
2b[−µ1+δ]
b−1
2b[−µ1+δ]
+ c−a
2a[µN′−δ]
.
We see that the maximum π1, namely π∗1 , is reached when
{Gk1 , . . . , Gkm} = {GN′}. This completes the proof.
Theorem 5 further confirms that µ is indicative of the capabil-
ity of a configuration in terms of “forcing” the overall dynamics
to converge to I∗ = (0, . . . , 0). Eq. (22) says that π∗1 is mono-
tonically increasing in µN′ for fixed µ1 and decreasing in µ1 for
fixed µN′ . Figure 4 confirms this property with a = 0.8, b = 1.5,
c = 2.4, δ = 10−5, while Eq. (22) leads to π∗1 = µN′−δµN′−6µ1+5δ .
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Figure 4: Dependence of π∗1 on −µ1 and µN′ .
Remark. In Theorem 5 we consider a single configuration C1
that violates condition (1). We can extend Theorem 5 to accom-
modate multiple configurations that violate condition (1), because
Theorem 4 can accommodate this scenario. However, if the goal is
to maximize the time that the system can stay in the configurations
that violate condition (1), the optimal solution is with respect to
configuration Cj , where j is given by Eq. (18), such that the sys-
tem will stay in Cj for the maximum portion of time π∗1 given by
Theorem 5.
4.2 Characterizing Power of MTD while Con-
sidering Cost
The goal is to make the dynamics converge to I∗ = (0, . . . , 0),
at minimum cost of launching MTD, while the system stays a pre-
determined π1 portion of time in C1. The preceding case proved
that π1 ≤
b−1
2b[−µ1+δ]
b−1
2b[−µ1+δ]
+ c−a
2a[µ
N′
−δ]
is necessary to make the dynam-
ics converge to I∗ = (0, . . . , 0). Let µl = β − γλ1(Al) for
l = 1, . . . , N ′. Let the cost function g(·): R+ → R+ be the
same as discussed in Definition 2, namely that g(µl) is the cost of
launching MTD to induce Cl for l = 2, . . . , N ′, where g′(µ) ≥ 0
for µ > 0.
Let σt be the desired “law" for deploying MTD, and denote by
Q = [qjk ] its infinitesimal generator. Let xl = 1−qll , where
1
−qll
is the expectation of sojourn time in configuration Cl. Then, the
portion of time in Cl is πl = xl∑N′
l=1
xl
. Our goal is to find the “law"
under which the cost is minimum. Theorem 4 specifies the desired
Markov “law" σt via its infinitesimal generator. Now we consider
cost function Ψ(x) with respect to x = [x1, · · · , xN′ ].
Let Gkl for l = 1, . . . ,m
′ and m′ ≥ 1 be the MTD-induced
configurations, namely πk = 0 for k /∈ {1, k1, · · · , km′} and
{k1, · · · , km′} ⊆ {2, · · · , N ′}. Under the the definition of Q in
Theorem 4, σt needs to satisfy:

0 < x1 ≤ b−12b[−µ1+δ] , x¯1,
xkl ≥
c+m′−1
m′
−a
2a[µkl
−δ]
, x¯kl(m
′), l = 1, · · · ,m′
0 < δ ≪ 1, a < 1 < b < c.
(23)
Note that x1
x1+
∑
m′
l=1
xkl
and xkl
x1+
∑
m′
l=1
xkl
are respectively the por-
tions of time in configurations C1 and Ckl . Define
π¯1 ,
x¯1
x¯1 +
∑m′
l=1 x¯kl(m
′)
, (24)
the maximum portion of time the system can stay in C1 when MTD
induces the m′ configurations. For any π1 such that π1 > π¯1 does
not hold, π1 cannot be realised by a underlying Markov process.
Therefore, we assume that π∗1 < π¯1.
Denote the index set corresponding to Eq. (24) as
K =
{
{k1, · · · , km′}|π∗1 ≤ x¯1
x¯1 +
∑m′
l=1 x¯kl(m
′)
, k1 < · · · < km′
}
.
For {k1, · · · , km′} ∈ K, we need to find the “law" σt that satisfies
(23). From π1 = x1
x1+
∑
m′
l=1
xkl
, we have
∑m′
l=1 xkl =
1−π1
π1
x1.
The cost of launching MTD according to “law" σt is:
Ψ(x1, xk1 , · · · , xkm′ )
= π1g(µ1) +
m′∑
l=1
πklg(µkl)
= π1g(µ1) + (1− π∗1)
∑m′
l=1 xklg(µkl)∑m′
l=1 xkl
(25)
subject to 

xkl ≥
c+m′−1
ℓ
−a
2a[µkl
−δ]
, l = 1, · · · ,m′∑m′
l=1 xkl =
1−π1
π1
x1 ≤ 1−π1π1 x¯1,
0 < δ ≪ 1, a < 1 < b < c.
(26)
We want to compute the minimize cost
min
x,{k1,··· ,km′}∈K
Ψ(x1, xk1 , · · · , xkm′ ).
THEOREM 6. Given configuration C1 that violates condition (1)
and MTD-induced configurations Cl for l = 2, . . . , N ′ that satisfy
condition (1). Suppose π1, where 0 < π1 ≤
b−1
2b[−µ1+δ]
b−1
2b[−µ1+δ]
+ c−a
2a[µ
N′
−δ]
,
is the portion of time that the system must stay in C1. Denote by
G(k1, · · · , km′)
=
∑ℓ
l=1 x¯kl(m
′)g(µkl) + g(µk1)∆(k1, · · · , km′)∑m′
l=1 x¯kl(m
′) + ∆(k1, · · · , km′)
,
where
x¯kl(m
′) =
c+m′−1
ℓ
− a
2a[µkl − δ]
,
∆(k1, · · · , km′) = 1− π1
π1
x¯1 −
m′∑
l=1
x¯kl(m
′).
We want to find {k∗1 , · · · , k∗m} such that
{µk∗1 , · · · , µk∗m} = arg min{k1,··· ,km′}∈K
G(k1, · · · , km′) (27)
For given cost function g(·) with arbitrary constant g(µ1), the min-
imum cost is
min
x,{k1,··· ,km′}∈K
Ψ(x1, xk1 , · · · , xkm′ )
= Ψ(x¯1, x¯k∗1 (m) + ∆, · · · , x¯k∗m(m))
= π1g(µ1) + (1− π1)G(k∗1 , · · · , k∗m),
which is reached by launching MTD to induce configuration
{(Gk∗
l
, β, γ)}ml=1 via the following deployment strategy:
πk∗1 = (1− π1)
x¯k∗1 (m) + ∆(k
∗
1 , · · · , k∗m)∑m
l=1 x¯k∗l (m) +∆(k
∗
1 , · · · , k∗m)
, (28)
πk∗
l
= (1− π1)
x¯k∗
l
(m)∑m
l=1 x¯k∗l (m) +∆(k
∗
1 , · · · , k∗m)
, l = 2, · · · ,m.
Hence, MTD is (µ1, . . . , µN′ , π1,Ψ)-powerful.
PROOF. Suppose {k1, · · · , km′} ∈ K. We introduce variables
ζ2kl = xkl−x¯kl(m′) for l = 1, · · · ,m′, ζ2 = 1−π1π1 x¯1−
∑m′
l=1 xkl
and translate the minimum problem specified by (25)-(26) into the
following minimum problem:
Ψ(x1, xk1 , · · · , xkm′ ) = π1g(µ1) + (1− π1)
∑m′
l=1 xklg(µkl)∑m′
l=1 xkl
subject to

xkl = ζ
2
kl
+ x¯kl(m
′), l = 1, · · · ,m′,∑m′
l=1 xkl =
1−π1
π1
x1,∑m′
l=1 xkl + ζ
2 = 1−π1
π1
x¯1.
Let x = [xk1 , · · · , xkm′ ], ζ = [ζk1 · · · , ζkm′ ], and
α = [α′, α′′, αk1 · · · , αkm′ ]. We study the Lagrange function
Λ1(x, ζ, α) = Ψ(x1, xk1 , · · · , xkm′ ) +
m′∑
l=1
αkl [xkl − ζ2kl − x¯kl(m′)] + α′

 m′∑
l=1
xkl −
1− π1
π1
x1

+
α′′

 m′∑
l=1
xkl + ζ
2 − 1− π1
π1
x¯1

 .
Find all stationary points {x, ζ, α} of Λ1, with gradient ∇Λ1 = 0.
The x parts of stationary points are
X1 =
[
π1
∑m′
l=1 x¯kl(m
′)
1− π1 , x¯k1(m
′), · · · , x¯kℓ(m′)
]
,
Xl =
[
x¯1, x¯k1(m
′), · · · , x¯km′ (m′)
]
+ el+1∆(k1, · · · , km′),
l = 1, · · · ,m′,
where el is the vector whose l-th element equals 1 and any other
element equals 0.
By comparing the costs of these stationary points, we find the
minimum cost of launching these ℓ configurations is
π1g(µ1) + (1− π1)G(k1, · · · , km′).
This complete the proof.
Remark. Similar to Theorem 5, in Theorem 6 we consider a
single configuration C1 that violates condition (1). We also can
extend Theorem 6 to accommodate multiple configurations that vi-
olate condition (1), because Theorem 4 can accommodate this sce-
nario. The extension is straightforward because the portions of time
that are allocated to the violating configurations are fixed and not
involved in the definition of cost.
4.3 Algorithm for Launching Optimal MTD
Theorems 5 and 6 are constructive and lead to Algorithm 2 that
can guide the deployment of optimal MTD.
Algorithm 2 Launching optimal MTD (dynamic structures)
INPUT: configuration C1, optional cost function g(·), MTD-
induced Cl for l = 2, . . . , N ′ and N ′ ≥ 2, constant a > 0 (de-
termining time resolution), δ (0 < δ << 1), optional π1
OUTPUT: Optimal MTD strategy
1: if cost function is not given (i.e., no need to consider cost) then
2: Compute π∗1 according to Eq. (22)
3: while TRUE do
4: Wait for time T1 ← exp(a/π∗1) {system in C1}
5: Launch MTD to force the system to stay in configuration
CN′ for time TN′ ← exp(a/(1− π∗1))
6: Stop launching MTD {system returns to C1}
7: end while
8: else
9: Find indices k∗1 , · · · , k∗m according to Eq. (27)
10: Set πk∗1 , . . . , πk∗m as defined in Eq. (28) and πk = 0 for
k ∈ {2, . . . , N ′} − {k∗1 , . . . , k∗m}
11: Wait for time T1 ← exp(a/π1) {system in C1}
12: k∗j ←R {k∗1 , · · · , k∗m}
13: while TRUE do
14: Launch MTD to make the system stay in Ck∗
j
for time
Tk∗
j
← exp(a/πk∗
j
)
15: Set ∆ = {1, k∗1 , · · · , k∗m} − {k∗j }
16: k∗j ←R ∆− {k∗j }
17: if k∗j = 1 then
18: Stop launching MTD to make the system stay in C1 for
time T1 ← exp(a/π1)
19: k∗j ←R {k∗1 , · · · , k∗m}
20: end if
21: end while
22: end if
In Algorithm 2, lines 2-7 correspond to the case of not consid-
ering cost, where each step incurs O(1) computational complexity.
Lines 9-21 correspond to the case of considering cost. Specifically,
line 9 incurs complexity O(2N
′
), which is not infeasible because
in practice N ′ (i.e., the number of MTD-induced configurations)
is often small. Possible instances of configurations the system will
stay include C1, Ck∗1 , . . . , Ck∗m , C∗1 , . . . andC1, Ck∗1 , Ck∗2 , Ck∗1 , . . . , Ck∗m , C∗1 , . . ..
5. LIMITATIONS OF THE MODEL
First, the present study assumes that the attack-defense struc-
tures and parameters are given. It is sufficient for characterizing
the power of MTD. Nevertheless, it is important to study how to
obtain such structures and parameters.
Second, the present study does not allow the attacker to choose
when to impose configuration C1. It is important to give the attack
the freedom in choosing when to impose C1. This incurs technical
difficulties. For example, the portion of time in the violating con-
figuration may not be fixed at π1, which breaks the setting of the
optimisation problem.
Third, it is interesting to extend the model to accommodate het-
erogeneous γv,u and βv . However, this will make the model diffi-
cult to analyze mainly because of accommodating βv .
6. CONCLUSION
We have introduced an approach of using cyber epidemic dy-
namics to characterize the power of MTD. The approach offers
algorithms for optimally deploying MTD, where “optimization"
means maximizing the portion of time the system can afford to stay
in an undesired configuration, or minimizing the cost of launching
MTD when the system has to stay in an undesired configuration for
a predetermined portion of time. We have discussed the limitations
of the present study, which should inspire fruitful future research.
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APPENDIX
Now we present the proof of Theorem 3.
PROOF. For any m ≥ k∗, we have π1µ1 + (1 − π1)µm > 0,
meaning that the dynamics will converge to I∗ = 0 by launching
MTD to induce configuration Cm with portion of time 1− π∗1 . For
any l < k∗, we have π1µ1 + (1 − π1)µl ≤ 0, meaning that con-
dition (2) for the dynamics to converge to I∗ = 0 is not satisfied
even if the defender launches MTD to induce configuration Cl with
portion of time 1− π∗1 .
If k∗ = 2, the dynamics will converge to I∗ = 0 by launch-
ing MTD to induce configuration Cl, l ≥ 2. Since f(·) is non-
decreasing, we have
Φ(π2, · · · , πN) = π1f(µ1) +
N∑
l=2
πlf(µl)
≥ π1f(µ1) + (1− π1)f(µ2).
It can be seen that the equality above can be guaranteed by taking
π2 = 1− π∗1 and πj = 0 for j > 2.
If k∗ > 2, we use Lagrange multipliers to calculate the mini-
mum cost Φ(π), subject to constraint (11). Since Lagrange multi-
pliers require equality constraints, we introduce vector of variables
x = [x2, · · · , xN ] with xj satisfying πj = x2j and variable ζ with
ζ2 = π1µ1 +
∑N
j=2 µjx
2
j − δ, such that solving the minimiza-
tion problem is equivalent to finding the minimum of the following
function Φ1(x) = π1f(µ1) +
∑N
j=2 x
2
jf(µj) subject to
h1(x) =
N∑
j=2
µjx
2
j = −π1µ1 + δ + ζ2
h2(x) =
N∑
j=2
x2j = 1− π1,
where Φ1,h1, and h2 have continuous first partial derivatives. To
solve this variant problem, we introduce Lagrange multipliers α1
and α2 and the Lagrange function as follows
Λ(x, ζ, α1, α2) =Φ1(x) + α1[h1(x) + π1µ1 − δ − ζ2]
+ α2[h2(x) + π1 − 1].
Denote by Φ1(x0) the minimum of Φ1(x). There exist α¯1 and
α¯2 such that (x0, ζ0, α¯1, α¯2) is a stationary point for the Lagrange
function Λ(x, ζ, α1, α2), i.e., with gradient ∇Λ = 0. Then, we are
to solve ∇Λ = 0:

∇x2Λ = 2[f(µ2) + α1µ2 + α2]x2 = 0
.
.
.
∇xNΛ = 2[f(µN ) + α1µN + α2]xN = 0
∇ζΛ = −2α1ζ = 0
∇α1Λ =
∑N
j=2 µjx
2
j + π1µ1 − δ − ζ2 = 0
∇α2Λ =
∑N
j=2 x
2
j + π1 − 1 = 0,
(29)
To solve (29), there are three cases:
Case 1: The optimal strategy is that the defender launches MTD
to induce only one configuration Cm. Then, m ≥ k∗ must hold
and the cost is Φ1(x) = π1f(µ1) + (1 − π1)f(µm). Hence, the
minimum cost of launching MTD to induce a single configuration
is
π1f(µ1) + (1− π1)f(µk∗), (30)
which is reached when inducing configuration Ck∗ .
Case 2: The optimal strategy is that the defender launches MTD
to induce two configurations Cl, Cm. The minimum cost will be
reached at l < k∗ ≤ m because the cost function f(µ) is non-
decreasing in µ > 0. Firstly, we look for the minimal cost when
launching MTD to induce configurations Cl, Cm, l < k∗ ≤ m.
This requires to find stationary points of Λ(x, ζ, α1, α2) such that
x2l > 0, x
2
m > 0 and x2k = 0 for k ≥ 2, k 6= l,m. It can be verified
that the following points are stationary points for Λ(x, ζ, α1, α2):[
x2l
x2m
]
=
1
µk − µ1
[
(µm − δ) + π1(µ1 − µm)
−(µl − δ) + π1(µl − µ1)
]
,
ζ = 0, x2k = 0, k ≥ 2, k 6= l,m.
and the corresponding cost is F (µl, µm). Hence, the minimum
cost of inducing two configurations is
min
l<k∗≤m
F (µl, µm), (31)
which is reached by launching MTD to induce configurations Cl∗ , Cm∗
according to πl∗ , πm∗ in Eq. (15).
Case 3: The optimal strategy is that the defender launches MTD
to induce m′ ≥ 3 configurations Ckj , 1 ≤ j ≤ m′. To find the
minimum cost, we need to find stationary points of Λ(x, ζ, α1, α2)
such that x2kj > 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ m′ and x2k = 0 for k ≥ 2, k 6= kj .
That is, 

f(µk1) + α1µk1 + α2 = 0
.
.
.
f(µkm′ ) + α1µkm′ + α2 = 0.
(32)
Thus, the stationary point x should satisfy

x2k1µk1 + · · ·+ x¯2km′µkm′ = δ − π1µ1
x¯2k1 + · · ·+ x¯2km′ = 1− π1
x¯2kl > 0, 1 ≤ l ≤ m′, x2k = 0, k ≥ 2, k 6= kl
, ζ = 0.
The cost at this stationary points x becomes
Φ =x2k1f(µk1) + · · ·+ x2km′ f(µkm′ )
=− (δ − π1µ1)α1 − (1− π1)α2
=F (µk1 , µk2). (33)
If (32) does not hold, then there is no stationary point x in the form
x2kj > 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ m′ and x2k = 0 for k ≥ 2, k 6= kj , meaning
that there is no minimum cost when inducing these configurations.
By comparing the costs given by Eqs. (30), (31), and (33), we
conclude that the minimum cost is given by Eq. (31). This com-
pletes the proof.
